ventures such as hotels, real estate business, tourism resorts and casinos, and held by through CLOB reportedly totaled about 144 billion shares valued at S$229 billion (US$134.70 billion) since it started trading on January 2,1999 (Toh, 1999) .
According to the Stock Exchange of Singapore journal, CLOB shares as of September 15, 1998 , were valued at RM$29.2 billion or US$7.68 billion with an account of 172,419 CLOB investors. The KLSE announced on December 31, 1998 , that Singapore's Central Depository (CDP) will be recognized as an authorized nominee for CLOB shares until the end of 1999. The Malaysian government claimed that the trading of CLOB shares was used for speculative attacks on the Malaysian stock exchange and if such trading would have continued it could have triggered a massive sell down in Malaysian shares. The tying of the Malaysian shares held by Singaporean investors and to make it a matter of government-to-government issue would boost the stability of the stock markets of both Malaysia and Singapore. However, restricting the shareholders that held stocks in the the KLSE the whole of year 1999 thus dampened tourism development in Malaysia.
Implications for the Tourism Sector
While other factors have been at work, such as political uncertainty, environmental pollution, health risks and competitive pressures, there is a strong link between economic movements and the state of the tourism sector. Before the implementation of the capital controls in September 1998, the industry was already experiencing a serious decline in growth rates compared to earlier years of the decade. In 1994, tourism made up 4.6% of (~~$ 3 . 5 6 billion) compared with RM$4.5 billion-(~~$1'78 billion) in 1990. creating some 120.000 new jobs created so that tourism became the second largest foreign exchange trols represent an added complication. Malaysia's 1999 budget allocates ~~$ 1 7 0 million with 6.8 million in 1998. The tourists spent RM$2.5 billion (US$667 million) shovvine in Hotel sector in Malaysia contributed RM$2.96 billion (~~$ 7 7 9 million) or 31.8% of the RM$9.34 (US$2.45 billion) earnings from the tourism industry. Although there was a 167.9% increase in tourist arrivals from Singapore, China (137.2 % ), the Netherlands (108.8%), Germany (91.6%), UK (91.1%) and Japan (73.4%) for 1998, that is no guarantee that tourists will come back automatically and already there is some evidence of the new restrictions affecting visitors.
The rules require travelers to declare the amount of money in their possession when entering or leaving Malaysia. Under the ruling introduced, all travelers including Malaysians have to obtain clearance for specific amounts noted above from state customs officers. The Tourism Authority of Thailand claims Malaysian visitor arrivals have dropped 70% due to these rulings. At the Singapore-Malaysian Causeway, the travelers complain that customs officials enforcing the currency exchange regulations exacerbate existing congestion of foot passengers and traffic.
Withn the context of tourism, there are two main objectives of imposing capital controls and currency exchange regulations. Malaysia is mired in its first recession in over a decade and is under pressure to fend off the exodus of capital by maintaining a stable exchange rate to insure against speculative hedgng of funds. By lowering the interest sector. The measures, if strictly carAed out, could have a short-term, positive impact on tourism. Lowering the interest rate will allow tourism investors to borrow cheaply for their projects. Government officials hope that the ii~centives will reiuvenate manv poten-
The controls also provide the government with a chance to implement structural reforms 8 in the tourism sector. However. the lone-term effects of cavital controls on tourism 1 remain a matter of some debate with a series of causes for concern.
limit the amount of ringgits that investors can bring in and take out and if they require earning from stocks and shares to be kept in Malaysia for a year. CLOB, the Singapore market for Malaysian shares, was effectively killed when Malaysia introduced capital tember 15, 1998, were valued at RM$29.2 billion (~~$ 7 . 6 8 billion). Malaysia had claimed that CLOB was being used for speculative attacks against its stock market, but the effects of it on tourism related investment have not been determined as yet.
Also, the ultimatum to make RM$25 billion (US$6.57) in offshore ringgit valueless unless repatriated into Malaysia by September 30, 1998, is tantamount to blocking fortight capital controls desirned to stem the outflow of funds will prevent existing foreim establishments and investments from taking cash out of the country.
If the FDI for tourism projects declines, raising funds overseas will become difficult which will create the danger of the government being forced to print local money to finance the projects. Printing a moderate amount of local money is acceptable so long as it does not pose the risk of causing inflation, but it could actually encourage this because tourism related projects are often extensive in scale and require substantial amounts of capital expenditure. Another danger of creating excess money is that it may flow into real estate and the stock market, causing the prices of properties and shares to go up artificially. The bubble in unproductive sectors may thus start building up all over again.
The FDI total into Malavsia for 1996 and 1997 was US$4.7 billion and US$3.8 billion related and without foreign direct investment, business will contract and unemployment in the tourism sector will rise. Unemployment can have an impact on the real estate destinations. Table 1 provides details of hotel guest nights by orign in 1997 compared to recent arrival patterns. The present currency transfer approval system may cause a domino effect on neighboring countries. Malaysia is Singapore's first tourism destination and second largest trading partner. Singavore is also Malavsia's top tourism and real estate investment desinvisted thire. About 50 mil llion people pass through Malaysia's entry and exit points every year. Restricting money that can be carried out t o no more than RM$1,000 (US$263) in ringget or RM$10,000 (US$2,632) in foreign currency per person can breed smuggling and racketeering as reported in The Straits Times (1998).
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i , parallel or hack karkets in foreign exchange are likely to -develop. Among the more common factors in the development of an underground is the under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports. I long-term implications for the tourism sector, however, are still unclear. In the mean-I economic policy that does n ot give an opportunity to speculators to respond -to perceived weaknesses in the econo&c system. The large amount of capital flight out of the country is often the symptom, and not the cause of speculation (Tavlor, 1997) . Malavsia can correct the cause of currencv speculation as well track by removing the percei . I
A ived inconsistencies in its

Recommendations
Malavsia can minimize these potential problems bv, firstlv, being careful not to re-I J ' J lcially since offshore ringgit 'depogts in the order of Obviously Malaysia should look beyond its borders and seek regional partners in its attempt to control the exodus of capital. In view of the different developmental stages of the countries in its neighborhood, there is room for both vertical and horizontal linkages and integration, which will increase the policy's effectiveness, although certain political barriers do exist to effective regional cooperation and coordination.
Conclusion
The Malaysian government wants to jump-start its economy by imposing capital controls to insulate the currency from speculation. As has been seen, capital controls can offer a temporary window of opportunity to stimulate and reform an economy. The government has also sharply lowered interest rates, reduced bank reserve requirements, and instructed banks to maintain their lending growth at 8 percent. It declared two main objectives of capital controls: to maintain a stable exchange rate and to enable the government to pursue an easier interest rate policy in a bid to stimulate the ailing economy.
However, these objectives cannot be achieved unless the economic inconsistencies are addressed. Capital controls are not a substitute for prudent macroeconomics policy. They do give a respite for banking reform and corporate restructuring without volatile exchange rates forcing the central bank to raise interest rates and slow down the economy. There is, however, a danger that excessive expansion in domestic demand could lead to the deterioration of the trade balance, resulting in a loss of foreign reserves and capital flight. Malaysia should not allow its public and private companies to borrow extensively all over again. Supporting non-performing loans such as that for the Multimedia-Super-corridor, a prestige tourism and IT project, on the part of domestic banks will create the same problems that its neighbors face: asset bubbles, and over-investment in ambitious and unproductive projects.
Other questions include whether Malaysia can afford to maintain its capital controls even if there is no global consensus to check the excesses of currency speculation and is it possible for the country to cut itself off indefinitely from global markets. More importantly, what are the implications and consequences on economic sectors such as tourism if the capital controls are prolonged?
In terms of tourism, capital controls may discourage investors and tourists alike and frustrate the achievement of targets set in the 1999 Budget based on the projected increase in hospitality and tourism earnings. The authorities might be described as creating obstructions on the road to recovery, rather than lifting them. Tourism thus appears to have become the victim of both the financial crisis and strategies adopted in response to it. It will be interesting to monitor developments in Malaysia and the performance of the tourism industry as it continues to struggle to come to terms with the crisis and its aftermath.
